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Abstract 
This paper uses the SVAR approach to assess the degree of labor market flexibility –
measured as the responsiveness of real and nominal wages to permanent and 
temporary shocks - in eight EU member states (France, Italy, UK, Netherlands, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) with a view to assessing their 
suitability for Euro-area membership. It is found that for Hungary and the Czech 
Republic real wages are more responsive to real (permanent) shocks than some 
current members of the Euro zone, such as Italy. On the other hand, in Poland and 
Slovakia, real wage flexibility seems to be extremely low, making higher 
unemployment more likely than other EU countries and early euro-area membership 
unadvisable.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the criteria for membership of an optimum currency area is that of labor 
market flexibility. Labor market flexibility can be considered to consist of two 
aspects: aggregate real wage flexibility and institutional flexibility. Aggregate real 
wage flexibility determines the overall balance of supply and demand in the labor 
market and is important if high levels of employment are to be maintained in a 
monetary union, since it is a substitute for the adjustment of the nominal exchange 
rate and an independent monetary policy. Institutional flexibility, on the other hand, is 
based on the institutional features of the national labor markets – such as minimum 
wage legislation, the design of the tax and benefit system and social protection 
schemes in operation – and may also serve to support labor market adjustment to 
shocks.  In this paper we assume that the institutional features as given and focus on 
nominal and real wage flexibility. This is because labor market reform has been very 
slow and so over a relatively short period of a decade there have been very few 
significant changes in the institutional structure of EU labor markets and also because 
in part such institutional changes are likely to be reflected in greater wage flexibility.  
The flexibility of the real wage rate is generally thought to be an important 
element of labor market flexibility. The traditional approach to examining labor 
market flexibility is to estimate a Phillips curve (Pentecost and Sessions 2002) or a 
wage curve (see Card, 1995 for a survey), which link the rate of unemployment to the 
rate of change in money wages or the level of the money wage rate, respectively. This 
research shows that unemployment-wage elasticities differ across countries and 
change over time. Much of the work done in the 1980s gives a wage-unemployment 
elasticity of about –0.10, but recent work by Montuenga-Gomez et al (2003), discover 
higher elasticities for France and Italy of -1.80 and –0.60, respectively.  Recent work 
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on the wage curve for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), suggests 
that although wages react more strongly to regional unemployment developments in 
the CEECs than in the developed EU member states, they are slightly less responsive 
to national unemployment rates (Huber, 2004)
1
. 
These studies of the wage curve suffer from the serious limitation that they do 
not explicitly take account of the equilibrating mechanisms in the labor market, 
whereby the demand for and supply of labor functions adjust to various real and 
nominal shocks.  It follows that real wage movements are a function of the shocks that 
buffet the demand and supply of labor relations and that real wage flexibility (or 
rigidity) needs to be measured in a way, which would predict how much wage 
flexibility would result from a given shock. Andersen and Toulemonde (2002), for 
example, using a theoretical, dynamic macroeconomic model with imperfect 
competition, show that temporary shocks are consistent with little real wage 
responsiveness and large employment responsiveness, while permanent shocks to 
productivity largely affect real wages and not employment.  
The principal contribution of this paper is to investigate the degree of 
aggregate real and nominal wage flexibility following real and nominal shocks using 
the structural VAR (SVAR) analysis of Blanchard and Quah (1989) on eight EU 
member states from the mid-1990s to date. The decomposition of shocks into real and 
nominal shocks is accomplished by imposing a long-run neutrality restriction such 
that nominal shocks have no long-run effect on the real wage rate. This restriction is 
consistent with the natural rate hypothesis of neo-classical economic theory. Thus 
permanent (real) shocks should have a permanent effect on the real wage rate, 
whereas temporary (nominal) shocks should have only transitory effects. This 
decomposition is also useful to gauge the effectiveness of monetary policy in the 
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various economies, since a large transitory component in the real wage due to nominal 
shocks may indicate a high degree of nominal inertia in prices, which enables policy-
makers to influence the real wage rate. As far as the new EU member countries are 
concerned any such influence of monetary policy on the real wage rate will be lost on 
membership of the euro-zone. Thus the finding of little price inertia in the new EU 
member states following a nominal shock is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient 
condition, for membership of EMU not to result in higher unemployment.  
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out a neo-classical 
model of the aggregate labor market, with a view to providing an economic rationale 
for the statistical identification of transitory and permanent shocks in Section 3. 
Section 4 considers the data set and the various time series statistical tests. Section 5 
examines the empirical results with regards to the effects of transitory and permanent 
shocks on nominal and real wage rates, while Section 6 briefly considers the 
consistency of these results with unemployment trends in the countries concerned.  
Section 7 concludes with an assessment of the policy implications. 
 
2. The Theoretical Underpinnings 
Although there are a large number of alternative models of the aggregate labor 
market, there seems to be a general consensus that permanent (real) productivity 
shocks permanently raise the real wage rate and temporary (nominal) shocks do not. 
For clarity this section therefore focuses on the neo-classical model of the labor 
market to motivate the empirical model, but the qualitative essence of the results 
generalise to a wider class of labor market models, including models which are based 
on some form of imperfect competition
2
.  
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 In the neo-classical labor market model it is assumed that there is perfect 
competition and that the real wage rate is set equal to the marginal productivity of 
labor. Thus if the production function is given by )(Nfy , where y is output and N 
is the labor input, the real wage rate ( PW / ) is equal to: 
 )(/ NfPW ,        (1) 
where 0)(Nf  is the marginal product of labor. Given the usual conditions of 
diminishing marginal product of labor, the demand for labor curve has a negative 
slope in real wage - employment space, as shown in Figure 1. Following Heijdra and 
Van Der Ploeg (2002), the supply of labor is assumed to be a positive function of the 
expected real wage rate, such that 
 )(/ NgPW
e
   or   )()/(/ NgPPPW
e
     (2) 
where ePW /  is the expected real wage and the function )(Ng represents the 
aggregate preferences of the households for work or leisure. Households’ preferences 
for work are assumed to be positively related to the expected real wage rate, so that 
0)(Ng , where the substitution effect of work for leisure, in response to rise in the 
real wage, is assumed to dominate the income effect. Multiplying both sides of (2) by 
the ratio of expected prices to actual prices ( PPe / ), enables the aggregate supply of 
labor to be drawn as a positive function of the actual real wage rate, as the second 
expression in (2) shows. 
These demand and supply relations are shown on Figure 1, where the market 
clearing real wage rate is w0 and the equilibrium level of employment is at N0.  
Permanent (real) shocks affect the market through the )(Ng  or )(Nf  functions. A 
rise in productivity, for example, is a real shock that shifts the demand function up, 
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raising the real wage rate and employment. Thus a positive permanent shock is 
reflected in a permanent rise in the real wage rate, to w1, in Figure 1.  
On the other hand, a transitory (nominal) shock is defined as a rise in the 
aggregate price level, P, as a result of a change in monetary policy. This will only 
affect the supply of labor curve temporarily, until price level expectations (and the 
nominal wage rate) are revised upwards and the supply of labor curve moves back to 
its initial position. In this case the rise in the nominal wage rate is permanent, but the 
change in the real wage only temporary. In fact the real wage may temporarily rise or 
fall following a nominal shock, depending on the relative stickiness of nominal wages 
and prices (see, for example, Spencer, 1998). Suppose the rise in P surprises workers 
then, real wages will temporarily fall as it takes time for workers to adjust their price 
expectations (and money wages) upwards. This relative ‘stickiness’ in money wages 
means that the real wage rates move counter-cyclically.  On the other hand, if workers 
over anticipate future price rises as a result of nominal shocks, then price level 
expectations, 
eP  and money wages may rise ahead of the actual price level. In this 
case the real wage will temporarily rise, pro-cyclically with the transitory shock
3
.  
Finally, if agents are assumed to have perfect foresight expectations then the 
permanent rise in the nominal wage rate would occur simultaneously with the rise in 
the price level and there would be no temporary impact on the real wage or the level 
of employment.  
Thus from this model temporary shocks emanating from aggregate demand 
lead to permanent changes in the nominal wage rate and no permanent effect on 
employment or the real wage, whereas permanent shocks to productivity lead to 
permanent rises in both the real and nominal wage rate and also to higher equilibrium 
employment. A permanent, positive shock to labor supply will also have the effect of 
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permanently lowering the real wage rate and raising the level of equilibrium 
employment. 
The empirical decomposition of economic shocks in the next section is, 
however, unable to distinguish between permanent demand shocks and supply shocks, 
only between hypothetical permanent (real) and transitory (nominal) shocks. 
However, to the extent that the empirical analysis shows the real wage falling 
following a permanent shock, then this maybe interpreted as a shift to the right in the 
labor supply function, ceteris paribus. Given the large structural changes that the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced since the early 1990s, 
however, it seems rapid productivity growth, brought about by market liberalization, 
the adoption of new technology and improved management efficiency (Eilat and 
Zinnes, 2002), is more likely to be the primary real shock affecting these labor 
markets. Temporary shocks, on the other hand, may be identified with aggregate 
demand disturbances, due to changes in monetary, and in many cases, exchange rate 
policy. In the Western European economies temporary (nominal) shocks could reflect 
the move towards inflation targeting during the 1990s and the preparation for the 
introduction of the Euro, whereas in the CEECs these temporary shocks might also 
include the impact of the removal of capital controls, which have lead to appreciation 
of the exchange rate (Brada, 1998) as well as fiscal imbalances left over from the 
transition process (Desai, 1998).  
 
3. The Empirical Identification of the Shocks  
It is assumed that there are two uncorrelated structural shocks driving the model: 
nominal shocks and real shocks. Suppose that the vector tt rwx [  tnw ] is 
stationary, where trw  is the logarithm of real wages, tnw  is the logarithm of the 
   9 
nominal wages
4
 and  is the first difference operator.  It is assumed that tx  is 
explained by the linear dynamic structural model (Lastrapes, 1992): 
tqtqttot uxBxBxBx .....11      (3) 
In order to normalise, zero restrictions are imposed on oB  and the residual covariance, 
such that:  
0
0
03
02
b
b
Bo    and  
22
11'
0
0
)( ttuuE  
qBB ,...,1  are unrestricted parameter matrices.  The data can be recovered only in the 
unrestricted reduced form of the structural model (3), such that 
toqtqotot uBIxBBIxBBIx
11
11
1 )()(...)(    (4) 
where tu  is white noise and contains two fundamental structural shocks.  Re-writing 
equation (4) gives: 
tqtqtt xxx ...11        (5) 
where 
2221
1211' )( ttE  
Equation (5) is the VAR representation of tx .  From the reduced form,  ,,....1 q  
and t  can be obtained.  It follows that the effects of the structural shocks tu  on tx  
can be ascertained if oB  and  are identified from the VAR estimates.  From (3), (4) 
and (5), we have 
'11
0 )1()1( oBB        (6) 
The identification problem arises in that there are four unknown parameters 
( 110302 ,,bb  and 22 ) to be identified, but estimation yields only three independent 
pieces of information ( 1211 ,  and 22 )
5
.  This means that one additional restriction 
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on oB  or  is needed for identification.  The additional restriction imposed in this 
paper is the long-run neutrality of nominal shocks on the real wage rate. This is 
consistent with the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis. 
It needs to be clarified how the additional restriction in the SVAR model can 
be reconciled with the different sources of wage rate fluctuations.  It is convenient to 
see the final form of tx  as an infinite moving average representation of the reduced 
from.  This expresses the dependent variables as a function of the exogenous shocks, 
such that  
t
q
qt LLLIx
12
21 ).......(                (7a) 
Alternatively, it can be expressed as: 
t
t
t
t
t
LA
LALA
LALA
nw
rw
)(
)()(
)()(
2
1
2221
1211
                (7b) 
where ijA  are polynomials in the lag operator, L.  The time paths of the effects of the 
various shocks on the real and nominal wage rates are implied by the coefficients.   
The two residuals in equation (4) have effectively been transformed into the 
two shocks, t1 and t2 in equation (7b).  Consider two types of orthogonal shocks, 
each of which could be the source of variation in the observed movements in real and 
nominal wage rates.  t1   is assumed to reflect changes in endowments, productivity 
and technology.  This shock may affect both the real and nominal wage rates in the 
short and long run. On the other hand, t2  is caused, for example, by nominal money 
supply shocks or a devaluation of the exchange rate. Nominal shocks are assumed to 
have only temporary effect on the value of the real wage rate but may have permanent 
effects on the nominal wage rate.  The assumption of the temporary effect on the real 
wage rate acts as the identifying restriction (see, for example, Enders and Lee, 1997). 
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The long-run neutrality of nominal shocks is represented by the restriction that 
the sum of the coefficients in )(12 LA  is zero, i.e. 
0
12 0)(
j
ja , where )(12 ja  is the 
jth coefficient in )(12 LA , or the effect of 2  on rw  after j periods. 
0
12 )(
j
ja  is the 
cumulative effect of 2  on rw  over time, and that the long-run effect of  2  on 
rw  is zero. The restriction that aggregate demand has no long-run impact on the log 
of real wages is imposed and follows from the assumption that the natural 
(equilibrium) rate of unemployment hypothesis holds in the long run.  
 
4.   The Data Set and Preliminary Data Analysis  
The data are monthly observations from January 1993 to February 2004 for France, 
Italy, Netherlands and the UK and from January 1995 to December 2003 for the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  Hourly wage rates are used for 
France, Italy and Netherlands, whereas weekly earnings are used for the UK. Monthly 
earnings are used for the new accession economies.  The wage rates are taken from 
OECD (Main Economic Indicators), except France (from IMF). The consumer price 
indices (CPI) from IFS are used for prices.  All variables are seasonally unadjusted.   
The logarithms of real and nominal wages for the eight countries are shown in 
Figure 2
6
.  With the exception of Italy, the time series for real wages have upward 
trends. The real wage series in Italy falls by about 3 per cent over the sample period 
and the real wage increase in the Netherlands is only about 4 per cent over the sample 
period. In comparing the developed and transition countries, Figure 2 indicates that 
the real wage growth has been much faster in the transition economies, ranging from 
60 per cent in Poland to 30 percent in Slovakia compared to just 18 per cent in the UK 
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and 15 per cent in France. This most likely reflects the degree of structural change, 
including the liberalization of prices in the new accession countries in early stage of 
the transformation process (see, for example, Fardmanesh and Tan, 2003 and 
Papazoglou and Pentecost, 2004). 
For the moving average representation of equation (5) to exist, however, 
requires that the vector process x  is stationary, and that there is no cointegration 
between rw and nw.  These wage series are, therefore, tested for unit root processes 
and cointegration relationships.  The results are presented in Table 1.  The ADF test 
statistics indicate that a unit root cannot be rejected for either real or nominal wage 
rates and therefore rw  and nw  are non-stationary processes. The KPSS tests 
(Kwiatkowski et al 1992) also confirm that stationarity is rejected at the 5% 
significance level, in all except three cases: nw of UK and rw of Czech Republic and 
Italy. The stationary of the UK nominal wage series and the real wage series of the 
Czech Republic is not rejected at a 5% significance level, but is rejected at a 10% 
level on the KPSS test.  In the case of real wages for Italy, the coefficient on the trend 
is significant, so it is reasonable to treat the KPSS test result with the trend as the 
appropriate result, in which case the levels of Italian real wage rates are non-
stationary. Overall the results suggest that the time series of the logs of real wages and 
nominal wages for all countries can be regarded as non-stationary. The Engle-Granger 
(1987) cointegration test results are also presented in Table 1 and show an absence of 
cointegration between real and nominal wage rates.  This implies that there is no 
linear, long-run equilibrium relationship between them and so validates the bi-variate 
SVAR model specified in Section 3.  
The lag lengths in the bi-variate VAR are determined by starting with a 
maximum of 16 lags and then testing down using including the Akaike and Schwartz 
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information criteria to select the lag length where there is no evidence of serial 
correlation according to the likelihood ratio test. Thus the lag lengths are between 11 
and 14 months for the countries in this sample, as shown in Table 2. Because of the 
pronounced wage spikes in Figure 2, rather than specifying seasonal dummies 
uniformly, monthly specific dummies are tested for significance month by month in 
the VAR. The monthly dummies are included if they are significant at the 10 per cent 
level in at least one of the equations. The inclusion of the trend is determined in a 
similar way.  
In addition, in order to examine the possibility of exogenous shifts in the 
variables, the significance of specific-event dummies were also tested by the Chow’s 
structural break test using a likelihood ratio statistic
7
. The specific-event dummies 
include the Asian-Russian crises in 1997 and 1998, and the policy change to inflation 
targeting taken in Poland and the Czech Republic in 1998. The dummy for the switch 
to inflation targeting in Poland and the Czech Republic is statistically significant. It is 
also evident from the plots of real and nominal wages, which seem to exhibit a 
structural break in 1998.  
The impact of the Asian and Russian crises is not rejected in the Czech 
Republic and UK equations, although the timing of the Asian-Russian crises 
coincided with a currency crises in the Czech Republic and a switch to a floating 
exchange rate policy. The structural break test therefore captures both the internal and 
external exogenous shifts for the Czech Republic, although it is likely that the break 
in the Czech Republic is more due more to the internal financial crisis rather than to 
external factors. Table 2 presents the VAR model specification based on these tests. 
Accordingly the period and policy shift dummies are specified in the VAR as 
deterministic variables together with the monthly and trend dummies where 
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appropriate. The fully specified VAR is estimated followed by the imposition of the 
restriction of long-run neutrality in order to identify the real (permanent) and nominal 
(temporary) shocks. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Figures 3 and 4 display respectively, the impulse response functions (IRFs) of real 
and nominal wage rates to both real (permanent) and nominal (temporary) shocks.  
Each plot shows the dynamic response of the wage rate to one standard deviation 
innovations in real (permanent) or nominal (transitory) shocks over forecast horizons 
from 1 to 48 months.  Because the first difference of each series is stationary and the 
impulse response functions die out, the figures are drawn for the logarithmic levels of 
the wage rates. 
Figure 3 shows that the impulse response functions for real wages reveal that 
the shocks are generally well-identified with the responses consistent with the 
theoretical priors, in that the real wage response to a positive real shock is positive 
and permanent, although with some initial overshooting in the case of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and to a lesser extent, the UK. Thus there appears to be a 
common feature between the Euro area countries and the non-Euro area countries, in 
that the IRF tends to be more volatile over the time horizon of four years in the non-
euro member states, such as the transition economies and UK, while in France, Italy 
and Netherlands given a real shock, the real wage converges slowly to the long-run 
equilibrium level with a gently curved profile.  In the case of the non-euro member 
states, the long-run level is achieved only after relatively volatile fluctuations, but 
often more quickly in about two years, compared to four years for the euro-area 
countries.   
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The magnitude of the real wage responses to the permanent shock differs 
between developed and transition economies, in the case of the former it ranges from 
0.2% to 0.6%, whereas in the case of the latter, from 0.3% to 2.4%.  It is, therefore, 
evident that the effects of real shocks on real wages in the CEECs are in general larger 
than those in the developed European Union (EU) economies. This finding is 
consistent with the more rapid increase in real wages for transition countries (Figure 
2).   
The effects of a transitory shock indicate some cyclical behaviour in real 
wages, which is potentially an indicator of the driving force behind business cycles 
(Gamber and Joutz, 1993 and Spencer, 1998) although this is more pronounced for 
some countries, such as the UK and the Czech Republic, than for others such as 
France and Slovakia. In France and Slovakia there is little cyclical variation after 
about two years, whereas for other countries the real wage rate is either still declining 
after about four years (Italy and the Netherlands) or fluctuating (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and the UK).  
In general Figure 3 also shows that a positive transitory shock increases real 
wages in the short run, apart from in Slovakia. This implies that aggregate demand 
disturbances and real wages are positively correlated in the short run.  Increases in 
demand are met by corresponding increases in output.  This requires an increase in 
labor inputs, which requires an increase in the nominal wage rate, provided the labor 
supply curve is positively sloped.  Thus wages tend to rise ahead of prices and hence a 
positive aggregate demand shock is associated with an increase in real wages  (also 
see, for example, Spencer, 1998).  Thus pro-cyclical real wages would indicate that 
nominal wages move ahead of prices over the cycle and is taken as evidence that 
relatively sticky prices have played a more important role than sticky wages in 
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transmitting aggregate demand shocks to real economic activity in the these EU 
countries. The only exception is Slovakia where the positive transitory shock 
decreases the real wage. Aggregate demand disturbances and real wages are more 
likely to be negatively correlated where money wages are relatively sticky compared 
to prices, as the neo-classical model of Section 2 demonstrates.  
The effect of a nominal shock on the real wages dies out over time, reflecting 
the identification restriction of long-run neutrality. In general, as compared with the 
real shock, the real wage is less sensitive to the nominal shock, but with the exception 
of the Netherlands and Slovakia, where an initial positive response is followed by a 
sharp decline, before returning, partially or fully, to the initial level. 
The evidence provides a useful indication that joining the single currency may 
lead to more stability in the wage structure in the face of real and nominal shocks.  
This, however, does not necessarily imply that the fixed exchange rate regime is more 
effective rather than the floating regime in stabilising the wage structure
8
.  In the EU, 
the individual member states face increased competition in product markets and this 
induces a more similar wage development and stronger wage interdependencies.  This 
situation could be further accelerated in the monetary union leading to the 
convergence of real wages among the EU nations, and this may be reflected in the 
IRFs for France, Italy and Netherlands being relatively stable
9
. 
Figure 4 shows that nominal wage rates all initially respond positively to a 
nominal shock, swiftly followed by a sharp decline and then a gradual convergence 
back to equilibrium, with the exception of the Netherlands where there is little or no 
decline. The pattern of nominal wage rates is very similar for a real shock: an initial 
rise followed by a sharp fall and then a steady path back towards equilibrium. An 
interesting result is that for the UK the path of nominal wages is very similar 
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regardless of the nature of the shock, suggesting that money wages are more flexible 
than prices.  
Table 3 reports the variance decompositions (VD), which measure the relative 
contribution to the forecast error variance of each shock as a function of the forecast 
horizon, of real wages at selected horizons.  The contribution of the nominal shock is 
not presented, but is given by 100% minus the contribution of the real shock. For 
most countries, with the exceptions of Hungary, Italy and Poland, at all time horizons 
the real shock accounts for most of the variance of the real wage with the 
contributions ranging from over 60% to 98%.  In the case of Hungary the contribution 
of real shock exceeds that of nominal shock up to the 6-month horizon.  This is 
consistent with the theoretical expectation that real shocks are more important for real 
wage rate adjustment
10
.  For example, an improvement in technology that raises the 
efficiency of production may increase the demand for labor, raising the real wage. 
This has important implications for membership of EMU.  Within EMU, there is little 
scope for demand management so the labor markets must be able to adjust to 
permanent shocks, thus any adverse real shock must be absorbed by wages adjusting 
to the new equilibrium level (Huber, 2004).    
The results for Italy and Poland are in sharp contrast to those of the other 
countries, because the real shock explains only 1.45% to 36% of the variance in real 
wages.  With the real wage rate not adjusting to real shocks, when faced with adverse 
real shocks unemployment is likely to rise by more in these economies than in those 
economies with more responsive real wages, and thus these countries are not good 
candidates for EMU entry. This is broadly consistent with the results of Dibooglu and 
Kutan (2001) for Poland and Hungary, where over the period from 1990 to 1999 
using monthly data, real shocks were found to play a significant role in explaining 
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real exchange rate fluctuations for Hungary, whereas such a significant role of real 
shocks was not observed for Poland. There is some evidence to support the different 
contribution of real shocks on real wages in Poland and Hungary, in that over the 
period 1995 to 1997 real wage increases have exceeded productivity gains for Poland, 
whereas Hungary enjoyed productivity gains above real wage increases (Dibooglu 
and Kutan, 2001).  
Moreover, in a recent study Kempa (2000) finds that for France, Italy, 
Netherlands and the UK, for exchange rates over the sample period 1972:1 to 1996:4 
(quarterly data), the results are broadly consistent with our findings for real wages.  
The VD of the forecast errors suggest that the contribution of real shocks is larger 
than that of nominal shocks in explaining real exchange rates for the Netherlands and 
the UK, whereas for France, the contribution is more or less the same between the two 
shocks, and for Italy, the real exchange rates are more fully explained by monetary 
shocks.   
All these findings imply that where real shocks explain more of the real 
exchange rate fluctuations, they also contribute to explaining more of the real wage 
fluctuations. If real shocks affect the real exchange rate, then there is an impact on 
international competitiveness, necessitating changes in output, which are likely to 
affect the real wage rate.  
 
6. Unemployment and Wage Flexibility 
It has been empirically demonstrated that there is a strong, significant correlation 
between wage flexibility and unemployment in studies of the wage curve (Card, 
1995).  It is then reasonable to examine if there is any relationship between the real 
wage flexibility claimed based on the variance decomposition results
11
 and 
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unemployment conditions for these countries. Figure 5 shows the actual rate of 
unemployment, which is plotted with a linear trend line and also the deviation from 
the trend, and Table 4 presents the mean rate of unemployment and maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation of the deviations from the trend
12
.  The noticeable 
difference between the developed economies and the transition economies is that the 
developed EU countries have a broadly downward trend line, whereas most CEECs 
have an upward trend (except Hungary).  Poland and Slovakia show a relatively high 
unemployment rate with the peak of around 20% in the early 2000s, which is 
accompanied by a considerable deviation from the trend with a standard deviation of 
around 1.9 as shown in Table 4. 
The increase in the rate of unemployment in the CEECs over the last decade 
suggests that as the transition from a controlled to a market-determined economy 
proceeds, there is a temporary loss of price competitiveness relative to the developed 
EU countries, due to the temporary immobility of labor between the rising and 
traditional, declining sectors
13
.  Boeri and Burda (1996), Burda and Profit (1966), 
Profit and Sperlich (1998) and Munich et al. (1998) have modelled the inflexibility of 
the job market in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, using the ‘matching functions 
approach’ where it takes time for a worker to find a suitable vacancy because of 
transaction costs associated with, for example, regional disparities or skill mismatch.  
A lack of well-functioning financial markets may further exacerbate labor immobility, 
where workers cannot borrow money for house purchase in a different region and 
workers cannot easily borrow money to start new businesses. There is also evidence 
that at the outset of the transition, policies aimed at making unemployment 
compensation more generous, provided opportunities for the unemployed to exploit 
the position by earning in the informal sector (Bouev, 2002). In the case of Hungary, 
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the size of the informal economy notwithstanding, these factors seem to have been 
weaker than in the other CEECs, in that there is a decay in the measured rate of 
unemployment over the sample. 
 Amongst the developed EU countries, Italy and France have a relatively 
higher unemployment rate than the Netherlands and the UK.  For Italy, the deviation 
from the trend appears to be quite large, although recent estimates suggest that Italy 
has a very large informal sector, perhaps amounting to 28% of GDP (Schneider, 2000 
and Schneider and Enste, 2000).  Table 4 indicates that the standard deviation from 
the trend is at 0.90. (Note that the rate of unemployment in Netherlands deviates quite 
significantly, however, with the relatively low rates of unemployment it is not a major 
concern.)  The contribution of real shocks on real wages is found to be insignificant in 
Italy and Poland. This may explain the higher rate of unemployment and a relatively 
large deviation from trend in these two countries, but in part it may also reflect the 
size of the informal sector in these economies, especially in Italy
14
.  It can be 
postulated that due to less sensitivity to real shocks, real wages are more likely to be 
rigid and the labor market slower to adjust leaving the measured rate of 
unemployment above the trend. 
 Slovakia, however, shows both a high unemployment rate and a real wage 
variance that is largely accounted for by real shocks. Interestingly, although not 
reported in this paper, the VD reveals that 95% to 98% of the nominal wage 
fluctuations are also explained by the real shock
15
.  This suggests that price-rigidity 
predominates in this economy and that the transformation of the economy into a 
market economy is perhaps proceeding only slowly
16
.  
 
7.   Conclusions 
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In the new enlarged EU labor markets will become more exposed to international 
competition that greater integration of product markets brings. Reallocations of labor 
between different sectors of the economies, reflecting changing patterns of 
comparative advantage with consequent effects on productivity is inevitable. 
Therefore, the greater the flexibility of EU labor markets the lower will be 
equilibrium EU rates of unemployment.  
This paper has examined the flexibility of labor markets through an analysis of 
the real wage responsiveness to temporary and permanent shocks for selected EU 
countries by using a structural VAR model.  The impulse response functions indicate 
that the real wage rates of most EU members responded positively to both nominal 
and real shocks, with the exception of Slovakia. In the study of variance 
decomposition, in all countries except Italy and Poland, real wages are largely 
explained by real shocks. The analysis shows that countries, in which real shocks are 
the major determinants of real wage fluctuations, tend to experience a relatively low 
rate of unemployment and relatively small deviations of the rate of unemployment 
from the trend.  In Italy and Poland, where real wage fluctuations are largely 
explained by temporary shocks, there has been higher and more persistent 
unemployment, reflecting less flexible labor markets and in Italy a large informal 
sector. Slovakia is a unique case, in that the ineffectiveness of demand policy to affect 
either real or nominal wages rates has been associated with a relatively high and 
volatile rate of unemployment. Thus labor market disequilibria seem to persist longer 
in Italy, Poland and Slovakia.   
The policy implication from this analysis is that the Czech Republic and 
Hungary are suitable candidates for membership of the Euro area, at least from the 
perspective of the degree of real wage flexibility, although for Poland and Slovakia 
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the unemployment risks associated with less real wage flexibility are much greater. It 
is also interesting to note that Italy, although a founding member of the EU in the 
1950s, still seems to have rather inflexible labor markets and a very large shadow 
economy. This suggests that at least in practice Euro-area membership should not just 
depend on the nominal Maastricht criteria, but also on the degree of labor market 
flexibility.  Moreover, on this broader criterion some of the new members states 
maybe better candidates than some existing member states. 
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Figure 1: Distinguishing between Real and Nominal Shocks 
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Figure 2   Plots of real and nominal wage rates 
 (solid line: log of real wage, dotted line: log of nominal wage) 
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Figure 3:  Impulse response functions: Response of real wage to one standard 
deviation innovations (   real shock, ----  nominal shock) 
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Notes.   
a. Horizontal axes indicate months.   
b. Wages are in logarithms. 
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Figure 4:  Impulse response functions: Response of nominal wage to one 
standard deviation innovations (   real shock, ----  nominal shock) 
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Notes.   
a. Horizontal axes indicate months.   
b. Wages are in logarithms. 
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Figure  5:  Unemployment rate and the deviation from trend 
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   actual unemployment rate (%)   ------  time trend,  the deviation from the trend (%) with the 
left side scale.  Sources.  OECD Main Economic Indicators.   
Note.  Quarterly data are used for unemployment rate.   
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Table 1  Unit root and cointegration tests 
 
Unit root tests  
(rw = the log of real wage and  nw = the log of nominal wage) 
  ADF constant 
(lag) 
ADF constant 
and trend (lag) 
KPSS constant 
(lag) 
KPSS constant 
and trend (lag) 
France rw 1.388 (2) 1.725 (2) 1.352 (9) 0.328 (9) 
 nw 2.179 (0) 1.068 (0) 1.415 (9) 0.350 (9) 
Italy rw 2.209 (6) 2.155 (6) 0.148 (9) * 0.150 (9) 
 nw 1.509 (6) 1.683 (6) 1.438 (9) 0.334 (9) 
Netherlands rw 0.274 (12) 3.257 (12) 1.146 (9) 0.219 (9) 
 nw 0.306 (12) 3.279 (12) 1.429 (9) 0.315 (9) 
UK rw 0.441 (13) 2.386 (13) 1.410 (9) 0.251 (6) 
 nw 0.367 (13) 1.963 (13) 1.451 (9) 0.126 (4) * 
Czech rw 0.635 (14) 2.754 (14) 1.261 (8) 0.132 (38) * 
 nw 1.505 (14) 3.368 (14) 1.280 (8) 0.372 (5) 
Hungary rw 0.965 (14) 0.779 (14) 1.215 (8) 0.340 (1) 
 nw 1.523 (14) 2.338 (14) 1.183 (9) 0.319 (5) 
Poland rw 1.442 (14) 1.948 (12) 1.l06 (9) 0.214 (8) 
 nw 2.169 (14) 0.743 (14) 1.131 (9) 0.285 (9) 
Slovakia rw 2.841 (16) 3.118 (16) 0.956 (4) 0.207 (3) 
 nw 1.387 (16) 2.899 (16) 1.308 (8) 0.164 (8) 
 
Engle-Granger Cointegration tests 
 ADF constant (lag) ADF constant and trend (lag) 
France 2.018 (o) 2.011 (0) 
Italy 2.666 (0) 2.660 (0) 
Netherlands 2.370 (12) 2.464 (12) 
UK 2.934 (12) * 2.906 (12) 
Czech 1.880 (13) 1.119 (12) 
Hungary 0.074 (14) 2.245 (12) 
Poland 2.878 (0) 2.858 (0) 
Slovakia 1.906 (0) 1.896 (0) 
 
 
Critical Values ADF constant ADF constant 
and trend 
KPSS constant KPSS constant 
and trend 
Null Unit root Unit root Stationarity Stationarity 
1% 2.890 4.046 0.739 0.216 
5% 2.860 3.452 0.463 0.146 
10% 2.582 3.151 0.347 0.119 
Notes. 
a. The symbol * represents statistical significance at the 5% level, where the null is rejected in the 
case of ADF, and not rejected in the in the case of KPSS.   
b. ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) critical value is from Engle and Yoo (1987). 
c. KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) critical value is from Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt 
and Shin (1992). 
d. Akaike Information Criteria and Newly-West Bandwidth are used for the choice of lag length for 
the ADF and KPSS with the maximum lag 16. 
e. The Engle-Granger cointegration tests are conducted by regressing rw on constant, trend and nw 
except Italy where the trend is excluded as it is insignificant at a 5% level. 
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Table 2  VAR Modelling 
 
 Lag length Trend (T) and dummies 
France 11 T, M2, M8, M9 
Italy 14 M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M8, M9, M10, M11, M12 
Netherlands 12 M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M8, M9, M10, M11, M12 
UK 13 D1, M3, M4, M5, M8 
Czech 12 D1, D3, M1, M2, M11 
Hungary 12 M1, M8, M11, M12 
Poland 13 D2, T, M1, M5 
Slovakia 11 M1, M2, M8, M11 
Notes. 
a. Sample period for France, Italy, Netherlands and UK is from 1993:1 to 2004:2 (134 observations), 
and for Czech, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia from 1995:1 to 2003:12 (108 observations). 
b. M indicates monthly dummy (e.g. M1, dummy 1 for January and dummy 0 otherwise). 
 
 Likelihood ratio tests of period-specific dummies  
D1 Asian and Russian crises: 
Floating regime in Czech:  
dummy 1 for 1997:5-1998:8 and dummy 0 otherwise 
France 1.81, Italy 2.63, 
Netherlands 2.44, UK 9.17*, 
Czech 8.78*, Hungary 4.58, 
Poland 3.86, Slovakia 0.44 
D2 Inflation targeting in Poland:  
dummy 1 from 1998:9 onward and dummy 0 otherwise 
Poland 6.90* 
 
D3 Inflation targeting in Czech:  
dummy 1 from 1998:1 onward and dummy 0 otherwise 
Czech 8.07* 
Note. 
The symbol * represents statistical significance at the 5% level with the critical value of 5.99 (df = 2). 
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Table 3:  Variance Decomposition of Real Wages  (relative contribution of real shock in %) 
 
 France  Italy  Netherlands  UK  
k Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. 
1 90.213 (0.003) 36.060 (0.004) 98.324 (0.003) 80.018 (0.007) 
3 88.136 (0.003) 35.186 (0.004) 95.631 (0.003) 76.957 (0.008) 
6 87.367 (0.003) 34.856 (0.004) 95.187 (0.003) 78.444 (0.009) 
9 83.672 (0.004) 35.174 (0.004) 94.785 (0.003) 76.930 (0.009) 
12 80.810 (0.004) 35.441 (0.004) 91.612 (0.003) 75.849 (0.009) 
18 78.335 (0.004) 36.650 (0.004) 91.370 (0.004) 65.415 (0.011) 
24 77.672 (0.004) 36.725 (0.004) 91.021 (0.004) 64.412 (0.011) 
36 77.449 (0.004) 36.882 (0.004) 90.970 (0.004) 60.828 (0.012) 
48 77.434 (0.004) 36.917 (0.004) 90.958 (0.004) 60.237 (0.012) 
 
 Czech  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  
k Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. Real wage s.e. 
1 70.583 (0.014) 63.266 (0.015) 1.442 (0.020) 90.887 (0.019) 
3 59.678 (0.017) 51.663 (0.017) 6.857 (0.020) 92.538 (0.022) 
6 59.111 (0.018) 51.748 (0.017) 17.232 (0.022) 91.986 (0.023) 
9 66.263 (0.020) 45.866 (0.019) 25.536 (0.024) 89.577 (0.024) 
12 63.976 (0.020) 45.316 (0.019) 28.107 (0.024) 89.809 (0.025) 
18 65.034 (0.022) 44.927 (0.020) 31.501 (0.025) 89.954 (0.026) 
24 66.161 (0.023) 45.344 (0.020) 31.981 (0.025) 89.653 (0.026) 
36 68.201 (0.025) 45.741 (0.020) 32.243 (0.026) 89.734 (0.026) 
48 69.735 (0.025) 45.908 (0.020) 32.394 (0.026) 89.736 (0.026) 
Notes. 
a. ‘k’ indicates forecast horizon in months. 
b. Wages are in a differenced logarithm. 
c. The contribution of nominal shock is 100% minus the contribution of real shock.      
Table 4 The mean rate of unemployment and the deviations from the time trend  
        
 France Italy Netherlands UK 
 Mean  10.729 10.571 4.587 5.331 
 Maximum  1.049 1.309 2.545 1.246 
 Minimum  -1.425 -2.714 -1.519 -1.124 
 S.D. 0.730 0.904 1.033 0.706 
     
 Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia 
 Mean  6.871 7.504 14.898 15.292 
 Maximum  1.940 1.199 3.644 3.477 
 Minimum  -1.022 -0.736 -3.817 -2.868 
 S.D. 0.926 0.537 1.987 1.872 
 
Notes. 
a. The sample period is 1993-2003 for developed economies and 1995-2003 for transition 
economies 
b. All figures are in percentages. 
c. Mean implies the mean rate of unemployment based on quarterly unemployment rate.  
d. Maximum, Minimum and S.D. are based on deviations from the time trend.    
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Endnotes 
 
1
 Huber’s sample was based on annual, regional data and included Bulgaria, The 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Iara and Traistaru 
(2004) also found that regional average earnings adjusted to local unemployment rates 
in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. 
2
 For example, Andersen and Toulemonde (2002), using a dynamic, monopoly union 
model where the managers of the firm have the right to mange, conclude that 
permanent productivity shocks lead to permanent increases in the real wage with little 
effect on employment, whereas temporary shocks are consistent with little real wage 
responsiveness. Similarly, the efficiency wage models of the Shapiro-Stiglitz variety 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), suggest that permanent rises in productivity lead to 
increases in the real wage rate, whereas temporary nominal shocks have little effect 
on the real wage rate. 
3
 At the microeconomic level this could be the result of menu costs (Mankiw, 1985), 
where although the general price level is rising, firms are reluctant to change their 
output prices because of the costs involved.  
4
 Note that even with the model ],[ prw , instead of ],[ nwrw , the contribution of 
real shocks in the variance decomposition of the real wage would be the same, 
because real shocks have no long-run effect on the level of prices or nominal wages, 
but can have a long-run effect on the level of real wages.  
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5
 The symmetry of the system is such that 1221 . 
6
 Since for both wages and CPI, the base year is 2000, the real and nominal wages 
plots intersect in 2000. 
7
 Hansen (2001) argues that an important limitation of Chow’s structural break tests is 
that the break date must be known a priori.  However, since this is not normally the 
case, following Debooglu and Kutan (1998), a break date is selected based on some 
known feature of the data and the significance tested.  This is to exogenously identify 
the dates for structural breaks, which are assumed to be based on a specific event or 
policy change and not for the occurrence of a decisive break. We are thankful to an 
anonymous referee for this point. 
8
 For example, the early part of the sample period for the developed countries is closer 
to that of a flexible regime with the experience of loosened ERM (European Rate 
Mechanism) parity grid after the EMS (European Monetary system) currency crises of 
1992-93 (Kempa 2000).  In the case of the transition economies during the sample 
period, for Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia the exchange rate regime is, more or 
less, characterised by the fixed rather than floating regime as they adopted a managed 
floating policy.  In Hungary, the policy of a crawling peg was combined with bands of 
more than ±1% in practice.   
9
 Anderson and Sorensen (2000) modelled a time varying wage convergence model 
by comparing the domestic real product wage to the foreign real product wage. The 
result supports the view that increased economic integration induces a potential wage 
convergence among the member states.  
10
 In their study of the US, Gamber and Joutz (1993) and Spencer (1998) also found 
that the total real shock accounted for most of the forecast error variance for real 
wages, ranging from around 75% to 95%.  
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11
 Note that we are assuming that real wages, which are explained by real shocks are 
more flexible than those explained by nominal shocks.  
12
 The link between official or measured unemployment and actual unemployment is 
weakened by the estimated existence of a substantial shadow economy in these 
economies.  Recent work by Schneider (2000) and Schneider and Enste (2000) 
estimate that the shadow economy maybe as much as 39% of GDP in Hungary. For 
most EU members it is estimated to lie between 13% and 16% of GDP, with Italy 
(28%) and Czech Republic (24%) the exceptions. The existence of a shadow economy 
may also make any relationship between measured unemployment and real wages 
more opaque. 
13
 Under the planning system, labor had been allocated through administrative 
measures for decade (Fardmanesh and Tan, 2003). 
14
 Indeed, it may be partly due to the rigidity of wages that a large informal sector has 
developed. 
15
 For other EU countries, variability in nominal wages is mainly driven by nominal 
shocks.  For France, Italy, Netherlands, Hungary and Poland, the nominal shock 
accounts for more than 50% of nominal wage variability.  For the UK and the Czech 
Republic, the nominal shock accounts for between 37% (time horizon k=3) to 48% 
(k=48) and from 29% (k = 48) to 62% (k=1) respectively, of nominal wage 
fluctuations.  The results are available on request from the authors. 
16
 Spencer (1998) argues that the failure of nominal wages to adjust in the short run to 
nominal disturbances may explain why employment temporarily deviates from the 
natural rate. Grubb et al. (1983) also argue that while real wage rigidity is often 
blamed for causing unemployment in the wake of adverse real shocks, such as 
changes in productivity or the terms of trade, nominal wage rigidity is blamed for 
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causing unemployment in the wake of adverse nominal shocks, like falls in nominal 
demand. 
 
